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Introduction
The usefulness of money lies in its ability to re-
duce transaction costs. This depends, in turn,
on public confidence in the stability of money's
purchasing power. In acquiring the requisite
monetary credibility, governments face a trade-
off between 1) creating institutions that limit
their ability to generate inflation, and 2) relying
on an established record for actually achieving
and maintaining stable prices. Those govern-
ments lacking an established reputation for
price stability must adopt stronger institutions
to foster confidence in the purchasing power of
their money.
The recent peso crisis is a good example of
this trade-off. Mexico granted its central bank
greater autonomy and made commendable im-
provements in its monetary policy prior to
1994. Money growth and inflation slowed dra-
matically after 1992. Nevertheless, these gains
were not typical of Mexico's broader experi-
ence and were too recent to constitute a credi-
ble monetary policy reputation. Following po-
litical turmoil in 1994, capital flows into Mexico
began to recede, and the country lost official
reserves. A marked rate differential between
Mexico's peso-denominated and dollar-indexed
debts prior to last December's devaluation in-
dicated that investors were becoming increas-
ingly worried about holding pesos. They feared
that Mexico would once again resort to infla-
tionary finance and devaluation. Without a
well-established track record for price stability,
the Bank of Mexico's newfound autonomy
could not endow it with credibility.
Events in Mexico, coupled with more market-
based development strategies in Eastern Europe,
Latin America, and Asia, have kindled an inter-
est in currency boards as an institution for pro-
viding monetary credibility in developing coun-
tries (see Hanke and Schuler [1994] and Hanke,
Jonung, and Schuler [1993D- A currency board
offers to exchange domestic currency for for-
eign exchange at a fixed rate, on demand, and
under all circumstances. It insures this offer by
fully backing the domestic monetary base with
a foreign-reserve currency and by setting the ex-
change rate as a matter of public law.
This currency-board primer begins by de-
scribing those salient features of the arrange-
ment that secure its monetary credibility.
1 As
• 1 Fieleke (1992) and Walters and Hanke (1993) also cover the
basics of currency boards.we discuss in section I, full convertibility at a
fixed exchange rate ties money growth and in-
flation in a developing country to those meas-
ures in the reserve-currency country, indepen-
dent of whether a central bank or a currency
board manages the exchange-rate peg. In strik-
ing contrast to a central bank, however, an or-
thodox currency board never acquires domestic
assets, and this prevents it from financing fiscal
policies, sterilizing reserve flows, or otherwise
engaging in discretionary monetary policies.
In the second section, we consider three
important criticisms of currency boards. The first
suggests that fully backing a currency with
foreign-exchange reserves is needlessly costly,
especially when domestic assets might offer a
higher return. The second criticism questions
the appropriateness of fixed exchange rates,
because movements in nominal exchange rates
can promote needed changes in a country's
terms of trade. The third criticism faults currency
boards for not acting as the lender of last resort,
a function that may be especially important to
developing countries. All things considered, cur-
rency boards' major advantage over central
banks is that for developing countries willing to
accept a diminution of monetary sovereignty
and some lessening in the responsiveness of
their terms of trade, a currency board provides a
stronger arrangement for acquiring a credible
commitment to price stability.




In large part, currency boards boost monetary
credibility because they link money growth in
a currency-board country to that in a reserve-
currency country. Reserve currencies, like the
U.S. dollar and the German mark, function as
money beyond their national borders. The
countries that issue them have relatively well-
developed financial sectors as well as reputa-
tions for comparatively low inflation rates.
Because they are widely accepted, reserve cur-
rencies provide good collateral against the
currency board's promise of full convertibility.
Today, currency boards in Argentina, Hong
Kong, and Latvia utilize the U.S. dollar as their
reserve currency, while Estonia relies on the
German mark. Although we assume that
currency boards hold only a single reserve cur-
rency, they have often held multiple currencies
as well as reserves of gold and silver. Estonia,
for example, initially considered linking to the
European Currency Unit — a composite cur-
rency — and started its operations with gold
reserves (see Bennett [1993D-
Because a currency board issues only do-
mestic notes against foreign exchange at a
fixed exchange rate, the money stock in a
currency-board country is related to the na-
tion's overall balance-of-payments position.
To illustrate this relationship, we assume that
commercial banks in the currency-board coun-
try operate on a fractional-reserve basis, hold-
ing currency-board notes (A^) in reserve
against domestic deposits.
3 In the absence of
legal reserve requirements, as is often the case
under currency boards, banks determine the
amount and composition of their reserves
based on four factors: 1) the size and turnover
of deposits, 2) clearing obligations, 3) the pub-
lic's relative demand for notes, and 4) the op-
portunity cost of holding reserves. The public
holds currency-board notes (Afc) and com-
mercial bank deposits for transaction purposes.
Currency boards have often appeared in
countries that experience widespread currency
substitution. We assume, however, that only
currency-board notes and bank deposits serve
as money in the currency-board country. This
simplifies the analysis without altering any fun-
damental conclusions. By improving confi-
dence in the domestic monetary unit, a cur-
rency board might greatly reduce currency
substitution. On the other hand, allowing indi-
viduals to hold foreign currency and foreign
currency deposits, as in Argentina, might fur-
ther constrain a currency board's ability to
renege on the arrangement and might heighten
its monetary credibility.
Under these circumstances, the monetary
base consists of currency-board notes held by
both commercial banks and individuals. The
money supply (M), which consists of currency-
board notes held by the public and commer-
cial bank deposits, is a multiple of the mone-
tary base:
(1) M= l + c
r+ c
• 2 Currency boards may also provide coin, a subject we ignore in
this article.
• 3 Some currency boards have offered reserve deposit accounts to
commercial banks.D
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where r is the average reserves-to-deposit ratio,
and c is the average ratio of notes to deposits
held by individuals.
As the currency board's balance sheet illus-
trates (see box 1), notes issued to the public
and to the banking sector cannot exceed the
currency board's receipts of foreign-exchange
reserves C#o).
5 The currency board's holdings
of foreign-exchange reserves are, in turn, di-
rectly related to the balance of payments (see
appendix). According to the balance-of-
payments identity,
(2) C+AK=ARo>
where C is the current-account surplus, AK
represents net private capital inflows, and
Ai?o > 0 refers to an official acquisition of for-
eign exchange.
When the home country runs an overall
balance-of-payments surplus (C+ AK > 0), the
currency board acquires foreign exchange.
Other things equal, the monetary base and
money stock expand. Similarly, when the home
country runs an overall balance-of-payments
deficit {C + AK < 0), its monetary base and
money supply shrink, other things equal. Con-
trary to common perception, a currency-board
country need not maintain a current-account
surplus to expand its monetary base. Develop-
ing countries, which rely on foreign capital for
growth, may experience current-account deficits
and larger net-capital-account inflows, resulting
in an overall balance-of-payments surplus.
In summary, we can state the money stock in
a currency-board country at any time, T, as a
multiple of the monetary base, which in turn re-
flects the foreign-exchange holdings of the cur-
rency board (equal to the cumulation of all past












Equation (3) is an identity. Changes in the
money stock result from developments that si-
multaneously affect the overall balance of pay-
ments or the money multiplier. If, for example,
investors in the currency-board country decide
to shift wealth out of deposits in that country
and into deposits in the reserve-currency coun-
try, they would first exchange domestic deposits
for currency-board notes through their commer-
cial banks, and then exchange currency-board
notes for the reserve currency with the currency
board. The domestic money supply would fall
and the overall balance of payments would shift
into deficit as investors deposited funds abroad.
Interest rates in the currency-board country
might rise, partially counteracting the desire to
invest in the reserve-currency country and
reducing the demand for currency-board notes
in line with the now-smaller supply. Prices
might also fall, encouraging exports.
All of these adjustments follow automatically
without government intervention. Unfortunate-
ly, they may take time, especially if wages and
prices are inflexible, and they may result in
some temporary dislocations in the currency-
board country (as, for example, resources shift
from the production of investment-related
goods to the provision of export goods).
Equation (3) indicates that the money stock
in the currency-board country will increase as
• 4 See Brunner (1973) for a general discussion of money multipli-
ers in an open economy. See also Osband and Villanueva (1993).
• 5 We assume throughout this paper that the exchange rate is fixed
and equal to one.
| 6 Most currency boards have dealt only with commercial banks,
which supply foreign exchange to their customers at competitive rates.long as that country runs a balance-of-payments
surplus. For the currency-board country to
acquire reserves, the reserve-currency country
must supply more money than its own public
wishes to hold. As the reserve-currency country
increases its money supply, short-term interest
rates might fall and domestic prices might rise,
creating arbitrage opportunities relative to the
developing country and a balance-of-payments
deficit in the reserve-currency country. As per-
sons in the currency-board country exchange
newly acquired foreign exchange for currency-
board notes, the money stock in the currency-
board country increases.
7
In the long run, this process should ensure
that money growth in the currency-board coun-
try approximates that in the reserve-currency
country.
8 The currency-board country acquires
credibility at the expense of losing monetary
sovereignty to the reserve-currency country.
The key aspect of the adjustment process
outlined above is that it is automatic; no discre-
tionary policy changes took place. Under fixed
exchange rates, a central bank would face simi-
lar automatic adjustments, but unlike a currency
board, a central bank can offset — or sterilize
— the contractionary monetary effects of the
capital outflow. In contrast to a currency board,
the money stock for a central bank is deter-
mined according to
(4)
where D is domestic assets, typically govern-
ment securities and loans to depository institu-
tions (see box 1). When a change in its foreign-
exchange reserves occurs, a central bank can
sterilize the effects on its domestic money sup-
ply through offsetting operations with its
domestic assets:
(5) - (A/?o) = AD.
The size of the central bank's portfolio of
foreign-exchange reserves limits its ability to
sustain a reserve loss associated with a balance-
of-payments deficit. This highlights a key insight
of the monetary approach to the balance of
payments: Central banks maintain balance-of-
payments deficits (surpluses) by supplying more
(less) money than their citizens desire.
If a central bank accurately identifies as
temporary the underlying problem causing a
balance-of-payments deficit or surplus, steriliza-
tion might be beneficial for avoiding interim
economic adjustments and dislocations. If, how-
ever, the underlying problem is long term or is
related to uncertainty about government or cen-
tral bank policies, sterilization can actually
worsen the capital outflow. Speculators realize
that the probability of a devaluation increases as
a central bank's reserves dwindle. They are
likely to move funds out of the country, thereby
aggravating the situation. Consequently, while
central banks may avoid adjustment to tempo-
rary balance-of-payments disequilibria, they
have no advantage over currency boards when
the underlying problem is persistent.
No Domestic
Unlike a central bank, an orthodox currency
board never acquires domestic assets. Among
other things, this precludes the currency board
from buying home-government debt obliga-
tions, from lending to state-run industries, or
from making loans to local banks. This crucial
prohibition separates the currency board from
the government's fiscal activities and prevents it
from engaging in discretionary monetary policy.
As Ow (1986) and Schuler (1992) both point
out, the decision to abandon currency boards
in the 1950s did not stem from their failure to
provide stable money. Instead, these newly
independent developing countries believed that
an inability to conduct discretionary monetary
policy would hamper their development efforts
(see Schwartz [1993D- Consequently, they es-
tablished central banks.
9 In actuality, most de-
veloping countries have relied on their central
banks to undertake a myriad of fiscal opera-
tions, including monetizing government activi-
ties (see Fry [1993] and Calvo and Vegh [1992]).
In addition to preventing currency boards
from acquiring government-debt instruments,
the prohibition against holding domestic assets
appears to constrain deficit spending. Absent
inflationary finance, governments seem more
concerned about fiscal competition with private
borrowers for available credit (see Osband and
Villanueva [19931). Ow (1986, pp. 47-48) shows
that under currency boards, Singapore and
• 7 On the connection between monetary disequilibria and the bal-
ance of payments, see Frenkel and Mussa (1985). Price increases following
a one-time rise in the reserve-currency country's money supply will eventu-
ally restore monetary equilibrium and eliminate the balance-of-payments
deficit.
• 8 The measured inflation rate may diverge because of nontradable-
goods prices, but should remain cointegrated. See discussions about
Hong Kong in Schwartz (1993) and Ow (1986).
• 9 Ironically, the success of currency boards in stabilizing the cur-
rency often facilitated the move to a central bank.Hong Kong typically operated with government
budget surpluses, while other former British
colonies that abandoned their currency boards
persistently maintained large deficits.
The prohibition on holding domestic assets
prevents the currency board from engaging in
monetary policy, but as Ow (1986, pp. 71-75)
argues, the government retains a limited ability
to influence the domestic money stock. Gov-
ernments in currency-board countries typically
hold portfolios of assets denominated in the
foreign-reserve currency. These portfolios are
independent of the currency board and, as we
discuss below, often result from currency-board
profits. By converting the foreign exchange
acquired from the sale of these assets into
currency-board notes, the government can alter
the domestic money supply. Hence, the gov-
ernment might finance a fiscal expenditure or
respond to an exogenous increase in money de-
mand (see section II, "Lender of Last Resort")
1
0
A government's ability to undertake such a pol-
icy depends on its holdings of foreign-currency
assets (or on its ability to borrow abroad). Un-
like discretionary central-bank actions, however,
this policy cannot undermine the currency's re-






As Schuler's (1992) historical survey indicates,
currency boards typically apportioned their
foreign exchange among three accounts. They
held approximately 30 to 50 percent of the as-
sets backing their notes in a liquid reserve,
consisting of high-quality, marketable securities
of the reserve-currency country that mature in
less than one year. They maintained 50 to 70
percent of the assets backing their notes in an
investment reserve that comprised higher-
yielding securities with a longer maturity and
somewhat greater risk. This split between liq-
uid and investment reserves was possible
because the public used a relatively fixed pro-
portion of notes and coin in circulation to fi-
nance day-to-day transactions and, under nor-
mal circumstances, would not redeem this
amount for reserve assets. The investment
reserve was an important source of profit for
the currency board.
Besides the 100 percent reserve backing
apportioned to the liquid and investment
reserves, Schuler found that currency boards
usually held an additional amount of foreign
exchange, equal to approximately 5 to 10 per-
cent of their note issuance, in a surplus reserve.
This surplus ensured that possible capital losses
on the investment reserves would never pull
the total amount of foreign-exchange backing
below the 100 percent necessary to fully guar-
antee all notes in circulation.
1
1 The surplus re-
serve grew from profits generated on currency-
board investments.
Schuler (1992, p. 188) found that the costs of
operating currency boards were typically very
small and that only two were unprofitable.
Even currency boards that started operations
holding less than 100 percent in reserve back-
ing were able to build their foreign-exchange
portfolios to the required level through earn-
ings on their investments. Typically, any profits
in excess of approximately 110 percent of the
currency board's notes in circulation were re-
mitted to the local government, enabling the
government to acquire the aforementioned
portfolio of reserve-currency assets.
By issuing its own currency in exchange
for the reserve currency and by investing its
reserves in earning assets, governments in
currency-board countries garnered seigniorage
(profits associated with the issuance of base
money) that they otherwise would have lost
because of currency substitution. Unlike central
banks, which earn seigniorage primarily from
inflation, currency boards gain seigniorage only
as interest from assets denominated in the re-
serve currency. Historically, capturing seignior-
age has been an important reason for establish-
ing currency boards.
Critics of currency boards have argued that
backing 100 percent of the monetary base with
foreign-reserve assets when domestic assets
yield more is needlessly costly. In their view,
the currency board could place its investment
reserve in higher-yielding domestic assets with-
out unduly weakening itself. Argentina cur-
rently allows up to one-third of its reserves to
be held in domestic instruments (see Bennett
B 10 Following the monetary approach to the balance of payments,
an exogenous increase in the money supply, other things equal, will even-
tually dissipate through a balance-of-payments deficit. Hence, the discre-
tionary actions of the government must simultaneously increase the
demand for money. See Frenkel and Mussa (1985).
• 11 Osband and Villanueva (1993, pp. 206-07) argue that with
reserves large enough to cover a likely valuation change, a currency board
could exist with a flexible exchange rate. Although Singapore is a prime
example (see Ow [1986, pp. 87-88]), afloating exchange rate greatly
reduces the credibility of the system. Thus, many analysts no longer con-
sider Singapore to have a currency board (see Schwartz [1993]).[1994, p. 6]). Some colonial currency boards
did invest reserves in domestic assets and




The opportunity cost of holding foreign
reserves, however, actually reflects country risk
and exchange-rate risk and is not a cost of
operating a currency board. If capital markets
are efficient, if capital is perfectly mobile, and if
domestic and foreign assets are perfect substi-
tutes, arbitrage will equate real returns across
countries. The higher interest rates that inves-
tors require of developing countries offset the
risks of currency devaluation, confiscatory
taxes, and capital restrictions. A currency board,
by providing a stable currency at a fixed
exchange rate and by constraining fiscal policy,
may reduce these risks, thereby encouraging
domestic investment and equating returns. For
a currency board to hold higher-yielding, but
riskier, domestic assets may impinge on its abil-
ity to instill confidence. As individuals substi-
tute foreign for domestic currencies, they incur
higher transaction costs, and the currency-
board government loses seigniorage.
Fixed Exchange
Rates
Confidence in a currency-board system results '
because it guarantees complete convertibility at
an absolutely fixed exchange rate.
1
3 In addition
to promoting monetary credibility, fixed ex-
change rates reduce the transaction costs asso-
ciated with exchange-rate volatility that is unre-
lated to fundamentals. These transaction costs
could be substantial for small economies that
are heavily dependent on international trade
and investment. On the other hand, currency-
board systems prevent exchange-rate changes
from helping an economy adjust to economic
shocks. Consequently, any cost-benefit analysis
of currency boards must consider the possible
trade-off between monetary policy credibility
and smoother economic adjustments.
1
4
When domestic wages and prices are inflex-
ible or when international arbitrage is other-
wise slow, flexible exchange rates can hasten a
country's adjustment to idiosyncratic economic
disturbances by facilitating rapid changes in
the terms of trade.
1
5 As one might expect, if
the currency-board country and the reserve-
currency country experience similar economic
shocks, the bilateral terms-of-trade changes will
not aid adjustment. Fixed exchange rates would
then seem optimal. Countries with comparable
economic makeups are likely to experience
similar and coincidental economic shocks.
When shocks are dissimilar, fixed exchange
rates can be feasible if other variables facilitate
adjustment. If, for example, the currency-board
country has a sufficiently well-diversified econ-
omy (in the sense that shocks are negatively
correlated across its producing sectors), changes
in the international terms of trade may not be
necessary in the adjustment process, since
unemployed resources in one sector will mi-
grate to other sectors. Similarly, adjustment in
the terms of trade will prove unnecessary if fac-
tors of production are highly mobile across
international borders. Then, arbitrage quickly
eliminates even small differences in prices or
interest rates. Closely integrated financial mar-
kets or fiscal transfers across countries could
also ease transitions to temporary shocks with-
out recourse to exchange-rate changes. Finally,
when prices and wages are highly flexible, the
terms of trade can adjust quickly without a
change in the nominal exchange rate. The
appropriateness of a fixed exchange rate in-
volves a country-by-country analysis.
In addition, Schwartz (1993, pp. 179-82)
argues that the choice of an exchange-rate peg
is complicated because the reserve-currency
country might not be one of the currency-board
country's closest trading partners. A change in
the reserve-currency country's exchange rate
might alter the currency-board country's com-
petitive position relative to its major trading
partners. A currency board pegged to the Ger-
man mark, for example, would have experi-
enced an 11 percent appreciation relative to the
dollar (and to countries pegged to the dollar) in
1994. Schwartz argues that this was not as
much of a problem for currency boards operat-
ing under the gold standard as it might be
today under more generalized floating.
• 12 The Southern Rhodesia Currency Board and the East African
Currency Board evolved in this manner (see Schuler [1992, pp. 106-08]).
See also Schwartz (1993) and Hanke and Schuler (1991).
• 13 Strictly speaking, the currency board does not peg the
exchange rate, but fixes the rate at which currency-board notes trade for the
currency of the reserve country. An exchange rate at which bank deposits
trade for foreign exchange will deviate within small arbitration points from
the currency board's rate (see Bennett [1993, pp. 18-20]).
• 14 Ishiyama (1975) provides a survey of the optimal-currency-
area literature, engaging in a cost-benefit analysis of fixed and flexible
exchange rates and discussing the examples that follow in more detail.
• 15 The terms of trade are the price of a country's exports relative to
the price of its imports, expressed in a common currency.Lender of
Last Resort
Currency boards enhance monetary credibility
by eliminating the opportunities for discre-
tionary monetary policies and by guaranteeing
the convertibility of domestic currency at a
fixed exchange rate. They do not, however,
guarantee the convertibility of bank deposits,
even though banking sectors in small, open,
developing countries may be particularly sus-
ceptible to macroeconomic shocks. The chief
criticism of currency boards, therefore, has
been that, unlike central banks, they do not
serve as a lender of last resort (LLR).
In periods of economic or financial crises,
uncertainty about banks' solvency often causes
individuals to shift their monetary wealth from
bank liabilities to currency. With runs impend-
ing, banks also attempt to shore up their credi-
bility by holding more reserves. As the public
increases its cash-to-deposit ratio and as banks
increase their reserve-to-deposit ratio, the
money supply contracts, leading to a general
deflation (see equation [3D. A traditional LLR
can avoid a contraction in the money supply
and prevent a collapse of temporarily illiquid,
but solvent, commercial banks by accommodat-
ing the increased demand for high-powered
money.
1
6 Usually, the LLR fulfills this function
through discount-window operations, but a
central bank can also undertake open-market
operations. Since an orthodox currency board
neither holds reserves against commercial bank
deposits nor undertakes discretionary monetary
policy, it is unable to perform LLR operations.
Recent problems with bank liquidity in Argen-
tina illustrate the vulnerability of currency
boards to banking crises.
Proponents of currency boards note that
banks in currency-board countries have often
been branches of large, global banks headquar-
tered in the reserve-currency country. They
believe that currency-board arrangements —
domestic notes backed with foreign-exchange
reserves at a fixed exchange rate — eliminate
exchange risk and thereby encourage branch
banking. Borrowing from a foreign parent then
affords the domestic branch bank an elastic
supply of reserve currency.
1
7 Selgin (1989)
argues that the ability of commercial banks to
branch reduces the likelihood of banking
crises, since branching effectively enables com-
mercial banks to diversify. A currency-board
country, despite an undiversified economic
base, could effectively diversify its financial sys-
tem through an unregulated (or minimally reg-
ulated) branch banking network.
Schwartz (1993) disputes the contention that
currency boards encourage branch banking.
She suggests that the extensive branch banking
found in British colonial currency-board coun-
tries stemmed from their colonial status, not
from their having currency boards. Many devel-
oping countries that today might benefit from a
currency board, such as Mexico, have not here-
tofore encouraged the entry of foreign banks
and do not have extensive branch banking net-
works. Whether sufficient branch banking




Many currency-board countries appoint a
wholly separate monetary authority to regulate
commercial banks (by setting capital require-
ments and reserve requirements) and to provide
LLR functions through a discount-window facil-
ity. The Bank of Estonia, for example, estab-
lished an Issuing Department, which is a cur-
rency board, and a Banking Department, which
regulates banks and acts as the LLR (see Bennett
[1993D-
1
9 Under such an arrangement, the inde-
pendent monetary authority would need to hold
either currency-board notes or foreign-reserve
currency. As long as the LLR finances its opera-
tions out of the currency board's surplus
reserves (as in Estonia) and avoids holding ob-
ligations of the fiscal authorities, it will not nec-
essarily undermine the credibility of currency-
board notes. The monetary authority might also
lower reserve requirements during banking
crises, thereby encouraging liquid banks to lend
temporarily to illiquid institutions.
2
0
As noted above, governments in currency-
board countries often acquire foreign assets, be-
cause the currency boards remit excess reserves
to them. The fiscal authority of a currency-board
country can also inject liquidity into the banking
• 16 Humphrey (1993) views bank runs as primarily disrupting the
payments system, while Goodhart (1987) views them as primarily affecting
banks' ability to intermediate between borrowers and lenders.
• 17 This argument applies to bank borrowing in general.
• 18 Ow (1986) argues that a developed branch banking network
retards the development of other financial institutions.
B 19 Schuler (1992) suggests that the original model for currency
boards was the Bank of England, which under the Bank Charter Act of 1844
split into separate Banking and Issuing Departments. Schwartz (1993) dis-
putes this, arguing that British authorities often attempted to suppress the
development of currency boards.
| 20 Argentina's currency board, which sets reserve requirements,
has lowered these requirements selectively in response to the current
banking crisis. Argentine banking authorities have actively encouraged
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NOTE: We assume a fixed exchange rate equal to one.
SOURCE: Authors.
system by selling foreign assets or by borrowing
abroad. The Monetary Authority of Singapore
has done this (see Ow [1986]), and Argentina
has recently borrowed from the International
Monetary Fund and from private sources to help
ease the restructuring of its banking system.
Although a Banking Department or the gov-
ernment might operate as a LLR, its portfolio of
foreign assets and its ability to borrow abroad
limit its capacity to create notes within the
currency-board framework and to fend off a
banking crisis. In contrast, a central bank that
issues fiat money does not face limitations on its
ability to create reserves during a banking crisis.
Consequently, one cost of operating a currency-
board system, particularly in relatively undiver-
sified developing economies, may be a greater
susceptibility to banking crises.
III. Conclusion
Because governments can generate revenue
from monetary expansions, no institutional
arrangement for stabilizing the value of money
is fully credible. A reputation for achieving and
maintaining a low inflation rate is necessary.
After a country has acquired a credible rep-
utation for maintaining reasonably stable
prices, many different institutional arrange-
ments may be capable of sustaining it. In the
interim, however, a trade-off exists between
strong institutional constraints and an estab-
lished reputation. Developing countries with
histories of inflation and devaluation must
adopt much stronger institutional constraints
on their ability to inflate than developed coun-
tries have done if they are to achieve even
moderately comparable levels of credibility.
Currency boards offer an approach whose





A nation's balance of payments is a comprehen-
sive accounting record of all transactions
between its residents and the rest of the world.
Although they are typically published only on a
net basis, balance-of-payments statistics incor-
porate double-entry-accounting techniques. Any
transaction that creates a receipt (such as an
export) is a credit, and any transaction that cre-
ates a payment (such as an import) is a debit.
Economists often group accounts into three
categories. The current account includes trade
in goods and services, receipts or payments of
interest and dividends, and unilateral transfer
payments to, or from, foreigners. The capital
account includes long-term capital flows, such
as direct investments and long-term portfolio
investments, and short-term capital flows, such
as investments in short-term money market in-
struments or acquisitions of bank deposits. It
also includes private and government capital
flows other than the government's "official" cap-
ital flows. Official reserves include official trans-
actions in various reserve assets, such as foreign
exchange. Under floating exchange rates, gov-
ernments use these assets to influence their
exchange rates. Under fixed exchange rates,
governments use these transactions to offset net
overall debits or credits in the other accounts,
since exchange rates would otherwise move to
balance these accounts. Acquisition or losses of
official reserves affect the balance sheet of a
nation's central bank or currency board, as we
described in the text.
Since every international transaction creates
both a debit and a credit in the balance of pay-
ments, the ledger always balances. If, for exam-
ple, a country imports a $15,000 foreign car andpays for it with a check drawn against a domes-
tic bank, the balance of payments records the
imported car as a debit and lists the foreign
claim on a domestic bank as a credit (see table
A-l). Essentially, the country exports owner-
ship of a bank deposit in order to import the
car. If the foreigner decides to acquire some-
thing else with the bank account, like stocks,
bonds, land, or computers, additional offsetting
debits and credits will enter the account. With
fixed exchange rates, if the foreigner elects to
exchange the bank account back into his own
currency, a debit appears under bank-related
capital flows, and a corresponding credit
appears under official reserves, as the central
bank pays out foreign exchange from its official
holdings.
Table A-l assumes that the foreigner pur-
chases $10,000 of stock and repatriates $5,000
of his bank claim. Should the monetary author-
ity not make this exchange, the foreigner's sales
of domestic currency will cause that currency to
depreciate. This in turn affects private decisions
about exports, imports, and capital transactions
in such ways as to restore balance to the cur-
rent and capital accounts.
Because of the double-entry nature of the
accounts, a surplus or deficit can exist only in a
subset of the accounts. How one defines a
balance-of-payments deficit or surplus largely
depends on which accounts one finds interest-
ing or useful to isolate. In our case, we define
the overall balance as consisting of items in the
current and capital accounts. Our example re-
cords a $5 billion overall balance-of-payments
deficit. (Note that the balance of payments re-
cords the loss of foreign-exchange reserves as a
credit. We import a foreign car, a debit, and pay
for it by exporting stock and foreign reserves,
both credits.)
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